In this paper we present a secure proxy signature scheme, which allows an original signer to delegate his/her signing capability to a proxy signer. Then the proxy signer can sign a message on behalf of the original signer. The proposed proxy signature scheme is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. We give the formal definition and security model of a proxy signature scheme and prove its security in our security model. Our proxy signature scheme does not use bilinear pairings, which results in greater efficiency and ease of implementation.
Introduction
The notion of proxy signature was introduced by Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto in 1996 [1] . The proxy signature scheme allows the original signer to delegate his/her signing right to the proxy signer to sign a message on behalf of the original signer. Afterwards, a verifier, which knows the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer, can verify the validity of the proxy signature issued by the proxy signer. Based on the delegation type, the proxy signature schemes are classified in full delegation, partial delegation and delegation by warrant. In a full delegation proxy signature scheme, a proxy signer uses the same private key as the original signer and generates a proxy signature as the original signer does. The disadvantage of the full delegation comes from the difficulty of distinguishing between the original signer and the proxy signer. In the partial delegation proxy signature scheme, an original signer derives a proxy key from his private key and sends it to a proxy signer in a secure channel. In a proxy signature scheme with delegation by warrant, the original signer gives a proxy signer a special message, namely, warrant. A warrant certifies that the proxy signer is legal and consists of signers' identity, delegation period and the types of the message on which the proxy signer can sign. Also, proxy signature schemes can be classified as proxy-unprotected and proxy-protected schemes. In an proxy-protected scheme, the original signer cannot forge a proxy signature in the name of the proxy signer. The proxyprotected schemes provide more security level than the proxy-unprotected signature schemes.
A lot of proxy signature schemes [6] , [7] and some ID-based proxy signature schemes with special features were proposed, such as identity-based multi-proxy signature [8] , [9] , identity-based strong designated verifier proxy signature [10] , [11] . Cao and Cao [9] claimed that their scheme is provably secure in the random oracle model. However, Xiong et al. [12] proved that their scheme is not secure under their security model. The first proxy signature scheme based on the factoring integer problem is proposed by Shao [13] , in 2003. Recently, Zhou et al. [14] proposed two efficient proxy protected signature schemes. Their first scheme is based on RSA [15] assumption and the second scheme is based on the integer factorization problem. Zhou et al. [14] claim that their schemes are more efficient than other schemes. However, Park et al. [16] point out their schemes are insecure. Moreover, Liu et al. [17] point out that Zhou et al.'s [14] schemes are vulnerable to the undelegated proxy signature attack: any attacker without the delegation of the original signer can generate a valid proxy signature. Xue et al. [18] proposed two proxy signature schemes based on the difficulty of factorings of large integers without formal security proofs. Recently, Shao [19] proposed proxy protected signature scheme based on RSA. Also, most proxy signature schemes are based on the difficulty of discrete logarithm problem [20] or elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem [21] . Chen et al. proposed in [20] a proxy signature scheme based on the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA). Mambo et al. [1] , [22] proposed three proxy signature schemes based on ElGamal's signature scheme [23] , Schnorr's signature scheme [24] , and Okamoto's signature scheme [25] . Proxy signature schemes are useful in many applications [29] , [30] such as electronic payment systems [2] , [3] and wireless networks [4] , [5] .
In this paper we propose a secure proxy signature scheme based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. The proposed proxy signature scheme is derived from the Goh et al.'s signature scheme [26] . Our proxy signature scheme inherits the strength security properties of the signature scheme proposed in [26] .
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we review the model of a proxy signature scheme. Then we present our proxy signature scheme in the section 3. Furthermore, we discuss some aspects of security in the section 4. The section 5 concludes the work of our paper.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the model and the security properties of a proxy signature scheme and the decisional DiffieHellman problem.
The model of our proxy signature scheme
In this section, we describe a formal definition of the proposed proxy signature scheme. Our proxy signature scheme has four entities: a Key Generation Center, an original signer, a proxy signer and a verifier. Verify: This is a deterministic algorithm.
Given a proxy signature  , a verifier uses the public key of the original signer and the proxy signer, to check its validity and outputs 1 if  is valid, otherwise outputs 0 .
The ecisional Diffie-Hellman problem
The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem was described by Goh, Jareck, Katz 
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The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem is hard in  if no efficient algorithm can distinguish with high probability between randomly generated tuples of these two types with high probability [26] . The decisional Diffie-Hellman problem may be defined formally as follows [26] :
-solve the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in the group  if  runs in time at most T and furthermore
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-solves the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in  .
The se curity mod el of our proxy signature scheme
The strong unforgeability is defined using two algorithms: algorithm  and algorithm  . Algorithm  simulates the hash and signing query for algorithm  as follows:  Hash queries: A query H serves as input for algorithm  . Algorithm  outputs a value of a previous hash query if this is defined before or a random value from l {0,1} , otherwise.  Proxy signing queries: Algorithm  request a proxy signature on the message m under the delegation warrant w . In response, algorithm  outputs the previously proxy signature, if the message m was signed before. Otherwise, algorithm
Algorithm  runs in time T  and the success probability of algorithm  to solve an instance of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in  is   .
Security properties of our proxy signature scheme
Mambo, Usuda and Okamoto defined the basic security properties of a proxy signature scheme [1] , [22] . Our proxy signature scheme should satisfy the following requirements:  Verifiability: From a proxy signature, a verifier can be convinced of the original signer's agreement on the signed message.  Strong unforgeability: A proxy signer can create a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer. However, the original signer and any third party cannot generate a valid proxy signature with the name of proxy signers.  Strong identifiability: From a proxy signature, anyone can determine the identity of the corresponding proxy signer.  Strong undeniability: Once a proxy signer generates a valid proxy signature on behalf of the original signer, the proxy signer cannot deny his signature generation against anyone.  Prevention of misuse: It should be confident that the proxy key pair cannot be used for other purposes. In the case of misuse, the responsibility of proxy signers should be determined explicitly.
Our Proxy Signature Scheme
In the proposed proxy signature scheme we need a third party called Key Generation Center to help a user (the original signer and the proxy signer) in order to generate his private key. However, the Key Generation Center does not have access to a user's full private key. The Key Generation Center just generates a user's partial private key using the user's identity. A user computes his full private key by combining his partial private key and a secret value chosen by himself. The public key of a user is computed from the Key Generation Center's public parameters and the secret value of the user and it is published by the user himself. The proposed proxy signature scheme is derived from the Goh et al.'s signature scheme [26].
Master key generation
This algorithm is assumed to be run by a Key Generation Center. Given a security parameter   l , the algorithm is as follows: 
Proxy key generation
The proxy signer generates his/her proxy private key. Firstly, the original signer signs the delegation warrant w and then sends the signature of w to the proxy signer. The delegation warrant w contains the delegation policy, including limits of authority, the message type to be signed, valid periods of delegation and proxy signatures, and the identities of the proxy signer and the original signer. The protocol between the original signer and the proxy signer is as follows: 
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Proxy signature generation
The proxy signer signs a message 
Proxy signature verification
y h h B            ) ' ( = 2 . 2. Checks whether ) , , , ( = w m B A H c      
Security Analysis and Comparisons
In this section we present aspects of security and efficiency of the proposed proxy signature scheme. The security of our proxy signature scheme is based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. 
Correctness of the proposed proxy signature
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Verifiability
The 
Therefore, the verifiability is derived from the correctness of the proxy signature (see Theorem 2) . Also, because the delegation warrant w contains the identity information and the limitation of the delegated signing capability, the verifiability is satisfied.
Strong unforgeability
Inspired by the work [26], we provide a proof of unforgeability of our proxy signature scheme. 
Proof. We use algorithm  , like in [26] , to construct an algorithm  which will run in time T  and solves the decisional DiffieHellman problem with probability   . The tuple ) ' , ' , , ( 2 1   y y h g serves as input for algorithm  and its goal is to determine whether this is a random tuple or a DiffieHellman tuple (see Definition 2) . Algorithm  will response the queries of algorithm  in the following way: 
Algorithm  outputs a valid forgery with probability at most:
We have: 
Strong undeniability
prevents the proxy signer from denying that he have signed the given message m , since the delegation warrant w is specified by the original signer in the proxy key generation phase. contains the delegation warrant w , which contains the identities and the public keys of the original signer and the proxy signer. Therefore, anyone can determine the identity of the proxy signer from the delegation warrant w .
Strong identifiability

Prevention of misuse
The delegation warrant w contains the signers' identity, the delegation period and the information about the type of the message can be signed by the proxy signer. Therefore, the proxy signer cannot sign other messages that have not been authorized by the original signer.
Comparisons
We summarize the computation time of the proxy signature schemes in Table 1 . For security reasons, assume that q is 160 bits and the output size of the secure hash function H is 160 bits [27] . Also, we assume that h is the computation time of one hashing operation, m is the computation time of one modular multiplication in a 1024 -bit modulo, p is the computation time for a paring operation, pm is the computation time of the multiplication of an element over an elliptic curve and e is the computation time of one modular exponentiation operation in a 1024 -bit modulo. The pairing operation is the most time consuming operation in an elliptic curve cryptosystem. Catalano et al. [28] showed that one pairing operation is about 20 times more expensive than one modular exponentiation operation. Also, one modular exponentiation operation takes on 240 modular multiplication operations [20] .
From the Table 1 , we conclude that, no pairing operation is required in our proxy signature scheme, only four exponentiation operations, two modular multiplication operations and two hashing operations are involved in the key generation phase. The signature generation phase of our proxy signature scheme needs two exponentiation operations, one modular multiplication operation and one hashing operation. Also, only two exponentiation operations and one hashing operation are needed in the verification phase of the proposed proxy signature scheme.
Conclusions
In this paper we proposed a secure proxy signature scheme based on the hardness of the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem. We proved that our proxy signature scheme satisfies the following security requirements: verifiability, strong unforgeability, strong identifiability, strong undeniability and prevention of misuse. The proposed proxy signature scheme does not use bilinear pairings, which results in greater efficiency and ease of implementation. 
